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Abstract
This paper examines the steady-state growth e®ect of in°ation in an endoge-
nous growth model in which the Calvo-type nominal rigidity with endogenous con-
tract duration and monetary friction via wage-payment-in-advance constraint are
assumed. On the balanced-growth path in this model, the marginal growth ef-
fect of in°ation is weakly negative or even positive at low in°ation rates because
the e®ect on average markup o®sets the negative marginal growth e®ect through
the monetary friction but the growth e®ect of in°ation is negative and convex at
higher in°ation rates because the frequency of price adjustment approaches that
of the °exible-price economy and the growth e®ect through the nominal rigidity is
dominated by the growth e®ect through the monetary friction. With a plausible
calibration of the structural parameters, this model generates a relationship be-
tween in°ation and growth that is consistent with empirical evidence, especially in
industrial countries.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies have found that the relationship between in°ation and growth
is non-linear. The stylized facts is as follows. First, there is a threshold in°ation rate
above which the marginal e®ect of in°ation on growth is negative and below which the
one is nonsigni¯cant or even positive. Second, above the threshold in°ation rate, the re-
lationship between in°ation and growth is convex in the sence that the negative marginal
e®ect is weaker as in°ation is high.
On the other hand, most theoretical studies fail to generate this non-linear relation-
ship. For example, in °exible-price monetary endogenous growth models with cash-in-
advance constraint, the marginal growth e®ect of in°ation is always negative as surveyed
in Gillman and Kejak (2005). In monetary endogenous growth models with the proto-
typical Calvo-type nominal rigidity as in Funk and Kromen (2006) and Kuwahara and
Sudo (2007), there is the threshold in°ation rate but above it the relationship is concave.
In this paper we show that, with a plausible calibration of the structural parameters,
a monetary endogenous growth model with the Calvo-type staggerred price setting with
endogenous contract duration as in Levin and Yun (2007) can generate the non-linear
relationship consistent with the empirical evidence for industrial countries, in the wide
range of in°ation. In this model, there is a threshold in°ation rate below which the
marginal e®ect of in°ation on growth is weakly negative or even positive because, at
low in°ation rates, steady-state in°ation a®ects average markup through the nominal
rigidity, which o®sets the negative marginal growth e®ect through the monetary friction.
As in°ation is high, nominal rigidity becomes weaker and the situation approaches that
of °exible-price economy hence the marginal e®ect becomes negative and the in°ation-
growth relationship is convex. In our numerical result, the threshold in°ation rate is
about 0.1%, which is consistent with empirical evidence in Khan and Senhadji (2001)
that the one is below 1% for ¯ve-year averaged data in industrial countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section
3 shows the mechanisms and the numerical results of the growth e®ect in the °exible-price
economy, in the prototypical Calvo-type sticky-price economy, and in the Calvo economy
with endogenous contract duration. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The model considered in this paper is a simple two-capital endogneous growth model in
which monetary friction via wage-payment-in-advance constraint of ¯rms is introduced.
Time is discrete. There are three types of agents in this economy. The representative
household, the monopolistically competitive ¯rms, and the monetary authority. For sim-
plicity, ¯scal policy is ignored.
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The representative household maximizes the following discounted sum of utility1:
1X
t=0
¯tflogCt + Ã log[(1¡ nt)Ht]g; (1)
where C denotes aggregate consumption, n 2 (0; 1) denotes hour worked, H denotes hu-
man capital stock, and Ã > 0 and ¯ 2 (0; 1) is exogenous parameters. The intertemporal
budget constraint is as follows:
Bt
Pt
+ Ct +Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±k)Kt +Ht+1 ¡ (1¡ ±H)Ht
=
it¡1Bt¡1
Pt
+ wtntHt + r
K
t Kt + ©t; (2)
where B denotes the quantity of nominal ¯nancial asset which earns the gross nominal
interest rate i, K denotes physical capital stock, ¼ denotes gross rate of in°ation, w
denotes real wage rate, rK denotes real gross rate of return on physical capital, © denotes
real dividend income from ¯rms they own, ±K is an exogenous parameter representing
depreciation rate of physical capital, and ±H is an exogenous parameter representing
depreciation rate of human capital.
Each individual ¯rm j (2 [0; 1]) monopolistically supplies the variety j, using a Cobb-
Douglas production technology:
Yt(j) = AKt(j)
®Zt(j)
1¡®; (3)
where A and ® denote exogenous parameters representing aggregate productivity and
capital share respectively, and where K(j) and Z(j) denote the demand for physical
capital and for e®ective labor respectively, each of which must satisfy the resource con-
straints,
R 1
0
Kt(j)di = Kt and
R 1
0
Zt(j)di = ntHt. It is assumed that workers must be paid
their wage-bill by cash in advance of production. Hence ¯rm j borrows its nominal wage
payment, PtwtZt(j), from a ¯nancial intermediary at the beginning of period t. Repay-
ment occurs at the end of period t at the gross nominal interest rate it. Consequently, the
total real production cost of ¯rm j is rKt Kt(j)+ itwtZt(j). From the ¯rst-order conditions
of cost minimization with respect to Kt(j) and Zt(j), it is holds that r
K
t =
®A

Kt
ntHt
®¡1
¹t
and wt =
(1¡®)A

Kt
ntHt
®
it¹t
, where ¹ denotes average markup, which is de¯ned as reciprocal
of the real marginal cost (the Lagrange multiplier with respect to (3)).
1To keep the model tractable, we assume log utility and quality time of leisure. Our ¯nal result is
robust even if the instantaneous utility function is assumed to be CRRA form, C
1¡¾
t [(1¡nt)Ht]Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾ or to
depend on raw time of leisure, C
1¡¾
t (1¡nt)Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾ , though its mechanism become more complicated.
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The aggregate demand index Y is assembled using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, Yt =³R 1
0
Yt(j)
µ¡1
µ di
´ µ
µ¡1
, where µ > 1 denotes the parameter representing the elasticity of
substitution. Hence ¯rm j faces a downward-sloping demand function:
Yt(j) =
µ
Pt(j)
Pt
¶¡µ
Yt; (4)
where P (j) denotes the price of variety j and the aggregate price level P is de¯ned as
Pt =
³R 1
0
Pt(j)
1¡µdi
´ 1
1¡µ
: Each ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t by optimally setting its price
subject to (4). Its details will be described later.
At the beginning of the period t, ¯nancial intermediaries have nominal money balances
Pt¡1Mt¡1 and receive a monetary transfer PtMt¡Pt¡1Mt¡1 from the monetary authority,
where M denotes real money balances, and lend all their money to ¯rms for their wage
payments
R 1
0
PtwtZt(j)di. Hence loan market clearing condition is Mt = wtntHt.
The aggregate demand consists of the aggregate consumption, the aggregate physical
capital investment, the aggregate human capital investment, and the aggregate menu
cost,2 hence,
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±K)Kt +Ht+1 ¡ (1¡ ±H)Ht + (1¡ »)­t: (5)
The monetary authority sets in°ation rate f¼tg.3
3 Growth E®ect of In°ation
Given ¹ and i, the steady-state growth rate of output ° is determined by:
° = ¯r; (Euler equation) (6)
r =
®A
¡
K
nH
¢®¡1
¹
+ 1¡ ±K ; (No-arbitrage condition) (7)
r =
(1¡ ®)A ¡ K
nH
¢®
i¹
+ 1¡ ±H : (No-arbitrage condition) (8)
Equation (6) implies that households' saving behavior determines growth rate of output,
depending only on real rate of interest, r. Equations (7) and (8) imply that arbitrage
2The ¯nal term of RHS in (5) denotes the aggregate menu cost. The datail is described later.
3This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the monetary authority sets nominal interest rate
fitg or money growth rate f´tg ´ f PtMtPt¡1Mt¡1 g. Stability of the equilibrium depends on the monetary
policy rule, but we ignore the detail of the rule because in this paper we focus on the steady state.
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between physical capital, human capital, and ¯nancial assets determines physical-capital-
to-e®ective-labor ratio and real rate of interest, for given ¹ and i.4 Hence in°ation has
growth e®ect if in°ation a®ects real rate of interest through the change of nominal rate
of interest and/or average markup. In the following subsections, we consider the °exible-
price economy in order to see the growth e®ect through the change of nominal rate of
interest, and the sticky-price economy in order to see the e®ect through the change of
average markup.
3.1 Flexible-price Economy
Let us consider the °exible-price economy, in which in°ation a®ects real rate of interest
through only the change of nominal interest rate because steady-state average markup is
constant, ¹ = µ
µ¡1 . The reason why nominal rate of interest a®ects real rate of interest
is that there exists a monetary friction by wage-payment-in-advance assumption. By
this reason, we refer to this growth e®ect of in°ation as monetary-friction e®ect. The
relationship between in°ation rate, real and nominal rate of interest is described by the
Fisher equation:
i = r¼: (Fisher equation) (9)
Substituting (9) into (8), it is holds that:
r =
1
2
Ã
1¡ ±H +
s
(1¡ ±H)2 + 4
¼¹
(1¡ ®)A
µ
K
nH
¶®!
: (10)
Given ¼, equations (7) and (10) determine real rate of interest. Figure 1 illustrates
the determination of real interest rate. When ¼ rises, (10) shifts downward and r falls.
Therefore, the marginal monetary-friction e®ect of in°ation on real interest rate and
growth rate is necesserily negative as in standard monetary endogenous growth models.5
3.2 Sticky-price economy with exogenous contract duration
In this subsection we consider the sticky-price economy with exogenous contract duration
(the prototypical Calvo model), in which each ¯rm can reset its price with probability
1¡ » and in which » is constant. In this economy, in°ation has an e®ect on real interest
4Note that real rate of interest depends only on KnH because we assume quality time for utility from
leisure. If it is assumed that utility from leisure depends only on raw time, 1¡nt, then the determination
of real interest rate becomes more complicated. However, our main results is numerically robust.
5This monetary friction works similarly as cash-in-advance constraint in standard monetary endoge-
nous growth models. In our model, cash-in-advance constraint of households does not a®ects growth
because cash-in-advance constraint a®ects only hour worked, n. If we assume that utility from leisure
depends only on raw time, cash-in-advance constraint has the growth e®ect as in standard monetary
endogenous growth models.
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rate and growth since the existence of nominal rigidity causes the e®ect of in°ation on
average markup, in addition to the monetary-friction e®ect. We refer to the e®ect on
average markup as sticky-price e®ect. As illustrated in ¯gure 2, a rise of ¹ makes r fall
because (7) and (10) shift downward. Therefore, a rise (fall) of average markup gives rise
to a fall (rise) of growth rate of output.
In this economy, for given ¼, the economywide average markup ¹ is determined by
the optimal pricing behavior of ¯rms and the price level equation as follows:6
~¹ =
µ
µ ¡ 1
1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1
1¡ ¯»¼µ ; (Optimal pricing behavior) (11)
¹1¡µ = »
³¹
¼
´1¡µ
+ (1¡ »)~¹1¡µ; (Price level equation) (12)
where ~¹ ´ ~P
P
¹ denotes the optimal markup set by ¯rms which can reset their prices.
From these equations, average markup is described as:
¹ =
µ
µ ¡ 1
1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1
1¡ ¯»¼µ
µ
1¡ »¼µ¡1
1¡ »
¶ 1
µ¡1
; (13)
hence average markup depends only on in°ation rate.7 As shown in Panel C of Figure
3, The relationship between in°ation and average markup is U-shaped.8 The intuition of
the U-shaped average markup is as follows. Equation (12) implies that the economywide
average markup ¹ depends on the average markup on ¯rms which cannot reset their
nominal prices ¹=¼ and the markup of ¯rms which can reset their nominal prices ~¹. On
the one hand, ¹=¼ is decreasing in ¼ for given ¹. It is because the average relative price
on ¯rms which cannot reset their nominal prices falls at in°ation rate but real marginal
cost is constant on balanced-growth path. On the other hand, from (11), we see that ~¹
is increasing in ¼. The reason is that as in°ation rate is high, ¯rms which can reset their
nominal prices set their markup to be higher because they are concerned by the possibility
that their markup would keep declining in the future when they cannot reset their prices.
By these two opposing e®ects, in°ation has an U-shaped impact on economywide average
markup.
Since a rise of average markup brings a fall of real interest rate and growth, the
marginal sticky-price e®ect on growth is positive at low in°ation rates and negative at
high in°ation rates. Figure 3 shows the numerical result of this relationship for various
values of ».9 We can see that the U-shaped average markup becomes more °at as »
6Derivation of (11) and (12) is in appendix A.
7Our assumption of log utility simpli¯es the analysis. If instantaneous utility has a more general
form, C
1¡¾
t [(1¡nt)Ht]Ã(1¡¾)
1¡¾ , then average markup depends not only on in°ation but growth rate of output
hence the mechanism becomes more complicated. However, even in the case, our results is robust.
8Under the assumption of log utility, we can prove this U-shaped relationship analytically.
9The values of the structural parameters is in appendix B. The Matlab programs for our numerical
analysis are on the author's website. (http://sites.google.com/site/hirokiarato/)
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decreases and that sticky-price e®ect disappears when » = 0. It is because the decrease
of » means that nominal rigidity become weaker and the situation approaches that of
the °exible-price economy. When » is su±ciently high, there is a threshold in°ation rate
below which the marginal growth e®ect is positive because the sticky-price e®ect o®sets
the monetary-friction e®ect. However, this relationship is concave in the whole range of
in°ation, which is inconsistent with empirical evidence at high in°ation rates.10
3.3 Sticky-price economy with endogeneous contract duration
Finally, we consider the Calvo model with endogenous contract duration as in Levin and
Yun (2007). In this model, each ¯rm is allowed to choose not only its price but also its
average contract duration (or the probability of changing its price). For simplicity, we
assume that the economy is on a balanced-growth path.11 In each period, ¯rm j can reset
the nominal price of their variety with probability 1 ¡ »(j). Moreover, ¯rms must pay
¯xed menu cost ­t ´ !Yt when they can change their prices. Given these assumptions,
each ¯rm maximizes the expected present-value of its current and future pro¯ts subject
to the demand function (4), choosing its price and the probability of changing its price.
Following Levin and Yun (2007), we restrict our analysis to a symmetric Nash equilibrium
in which all ¯rms choose the same probability of changing prices hence »(j) = » for all
j. In this economy, » and ¹ are determined according to (11), (12), and the optimal
condition with respect to contract duration of ¯rms which is described as:
~¹1¡µ(¼µ¡1 ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¼µ¡1)2 =
~¹¡µ(¼µ ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¼µ)2 ¡ !¹
1¡µ; (Optimal contract duration) (14)
when the internal solution exists.12 By allowing ¯rms to choose the frequency of changing
prices, ¯rms chnage their price more frequently as in°ation deviates from zero, as shown
in Panel D of ¯gure 4. The reason of this relationship is the existence of ¯xed menu cost.
If in°ation is near zero, the opportunity cost of unchanging their prices is small because
the deviation of price-unchanging ¯rms' markup from optimal one is small. Hence ¯rms
choose low frequency of changing price, concerned by ¯xed menu cost. As in°ation devi-
ates from zero, the opportunity cost becomes larger hence ¯rms choose higher frequency
even if they must pay the menu cost more frequently. If in°ation is extremely high, all
¯rms change their prices in every period hence the situation is same as the °exible-price
economy.
Varying the frequency of changing prices makes the sticky-price e®ect more complex.
In addition to the U-shaped markup e®ect in the previous subsection, there is the e®ect
10Moreover, this model can analyze the growth e®ect only at moderate in°ation. This model has an
equilibrium only if ¯»¼µ < 1 because lim
¼!( 1¯» )
1
µ
~¹ =1.
11For the ¯rm's behavior in stochastic economy, see the working paper version of Levin and Yun (2007).
12Derivation of (14) is in appendix A.
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that this U-shaped relationship become °atter as in°ation deviates from zero. Figure 4
and 5 indicate the numerical result, which is consistent with empirical evidence. First,
there is a threshold in°ation rate about 0.1% in year at which the marginal growth e®ect
changes from positive to negative. Readers may have a question that at severe de°ation
(below minus 0.1% in year) the marginal e®ect is negative. We think that the reason of
the positive or nonsigni¯cant marginal e®ect of growth in empirical studies is rare obser-
vations of severe de°ation. Since most of the observations below the threshold in°ation
rate are distributed around zero in°ation, the regression analysis would show an upward-
sloping or nonsigni¯cant relationship between in°ation and growth. Second, above the
threshold in°ation rate, the relationship between in°ation and growth is decreasing and
convex because sticky-price e®ect is weaker as in°ation is high and the situation ap-
proaches the °exible-economy in which only monetary-friction e®ect a®ects growth. As
the result, this economy can genarate the plausible in°ation-growth relationship in wider
range of in°ation than the sticky-price economy with exogenous contract duration. Third,
our model can be calibrated more accurately than endogenous growth models with im-
perfect information in credit market in Bose (2002) and Hung (2007), which also show the
existence of threshold in°ation rate. With our calibration of the structural parameters,
the threshold in°ation rate is 0.1%. In the empirical study in Khan and Senhadji (2001),
the threshold in°ation rate is below 1% in industrial countries and 11% in developed
countries for ¯ve-year averaged data. With this empirical evidence, we conclude that our
model can genarate the plausible threshold in°ation rate in industrial countries.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that the monetary endogenous growth model with the Calvo-type
nominal rigidity with endogenous contract duration can generate the plausible relation-
ship between in°ation and growth, especially in industrial countries. However, there are
some open questions in our analysis. First, our model suggests the existence of a lower
alternative threshold in°ation rate below which the marginal growth e®ect become neg-
ative. This hypothesis is potentially testble. If we had more observations of de°ation,
we could test the existence of the alternative threshold in°ation rate by dividing the
low-in°ation observations into two subsamples. Second, our model can not replicate the
plausible threshold in°ation rate in developing countries, that is shown 11% for ¯ve-year
averaged data in Khan and Senhadji (2001). This result suggests that the analysis for
developing countries needs some alternative assumptions. For example, imperfect infor-
mation in credit market as in Bose (2002) and Hung (2007). However, The measurement
of the degree of imperfect information is di±cult. In order to analyze the growth e®ect of
in°ation in developing countries quantitatively, we must obtain more empirical evidence
about market structure and about imperfect information in developing countries.
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Appendix
A. Derivation of (11), (12), and (14)
In the prototypical Calvo model, ¯rms which can reset their price at time t, choose their
steady-state relative price ~p ´ ~Pt=Pt, which is constant, to maximize the discounted sum
of its expected pro¯t until they reset their prices,
©t(~p; ») =
1X
s=0
µ
»
r
¶s "µ
~p
¼s
¶1¡µ
Yt+s ¡
µ
~p
¼s
¶¡µ
Yt+s
¹
#
= Yt
1X
s=0
µ
»°
r
¶s "µ
~p
¼s
¶1¡µ
¡
µ
~p
¼s
¶¡µ
1
¹
#
(15)
on a balanced-growth path. The ¯rst-order condition is described as:
1X
s=0
µ
»°
r
¶s ·
¼sµ ¡ µ ¡ 1
µ
(¹~p)¼s(µ¡1)
¸
= 0; (16)
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Using the Fisher equation ° = ¯r and the de¯nition of optimal markup ~¹ = ¹~p,
1X
s=0
(¯»)s
µ
¼sµ ¡ µ ¡ 1
µ
~¹¼s(µ¡1)
¶
= 0: (17)
After some calculation, we obtain (11).
See the aggregate price level equation,
Pt =
µZ 1
0
Pt(j)
1¡µdi
¶ 1
1¡µ
: (18)
When the probability that each ¯rm can reset their prices is 1¡ », (18) can be rewritten
as:
P 1¡µt = »P
1¡µ
t¡1 + (1¡ ») ~P 1¡µt : (19)
Dividing (Pt
¹
)1¡µ into this equation, we can see that (12) holds on balanced growth path.
Next consider the Calvo model with endogenous contract duration. Assume that ¯rm
j can change its price at time t. If it sets their relative price to be ~p(j), then the discounted
sum of expected pro¯t until it resets its price is ©t(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt. Therefore, its total
discounted sum of pro¯t Vt(~p(j); »(j)) is:
Vt(~p(j); »(j)) = (©t(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt) + 1¡ »(j)
r
(©t+1(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt+1)
+
1¡ »(j)
r2
(©t+2(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt+2) + ¢ ¢ ¢ (20)
Hence, Vt(~p(j); »(j)) can be rewritten as:
Vt(~p(j); »(j)) = YtÁ(~p(j); »(j))
·
1 + (1¡ »(j))°
r
+ (1¡ »(j))
³°
r
´2
+ ¢ ¢ ¢
¸
= YtÁ(~p(j); »(j))
£
1 + (1¡ »(j))¯ + (1¡ »(j))¯2 + ¢ ¢ ¢ ¤
= YtÁ(~p(j); »(j))
1¡ ¯»(j)
1¡ ¯ ; (21)
where,
Á(~p(j); »(j)) ´ ©t(~p(j); »(j))¡ !Yt
Yt
=
( 1X
s=0
µ
»(j)°
r
¶s "µ
~p(j)
¼s
¶1¡µ
¡
µ
~p(j)
¼s
¶¡µ
1
¹
#)
¡ !; (22)
which is constant on balanced-growth path.
9
The pro¯t maximization problem of ¯rm j has two steps. First, given »(j), ¯rm j
chooses its optimal relative price ~p¤(»(j)). Hence,
~p¤(»(j)) = argmax
~p(j)
Vt(~p(j); »(j))
= argmax
~p(j)
Á(~p(j); »(j)): (23)
We can solve this problem as in the prototypical Calvo model and obtain:
~¹(»(j)) =
µ
µ ¡ 1
1¡ ¯»(j)¼µ¡1
1¡ ¯»(j)¼µ : (24)
Second, given », ¯rm j chooses its optimal frequency of changing price 1 ¡ »¤(j).
Hence,
»¤(j) = argmax
»(j)
´t(»(j)); (25)
where,
´t(»(j)) ´ Vt(~p¤(»(j)); »(j)): (26)
By envelop theorem, the ¯rst-order condition is
d´t
d»(j)
=
@Vt
@»(j)
= 0: (27)
By (21), the ¯rst-order condition can be written as:
@
@»(j)
·
Á(~p¤; »(j))
1¡ ¯»(j)
1¡ ¯
¸
= 0: (28)
Some calculations arrange it as:
~¹1¡µ(¼µ¡1 ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¤(j)¼µ¡1)2 =
~¹¡µ(¼µ ¡ 1)
(1¡ ¯»¤(j)¼µ)2 ¡ !¹
1¡µ: (29)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, »¤(j) = », for all j. Therefore, we obtain (11) and (14)
from (24) and (29), respectively.
B. Calibration
In order to calibrate our model, in addtion to the equilibrium conditions which have
already been derived, that is, the Euler equation (6), the no-arbitrage conditions (7) and
(8), the Fisher equation (9), the optimal pricing equation (11), the price level equation
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(12), and the optimal contract duration equation (14), the other conditions are needed.
First, the optimal labor supply equation,
Ã
1¡ n
C
H
=
(1¡ ®)A( K
nH
)®
i¹
: (30)
Second, the aggregate good market clearing condition,
A(K
H
)®n1¡®
s
=
C
H
+ (° ¡ 1 + ±K)KH + (° ¡ 1 + ±H)
1¡ (1¡ »)! ; (31)
where s ´ R 1
0
(Pt(j)
Pt
)¡µdj ¸ 1 denotes the degree of relative price dispersion, which is
described as:
s = (1¡ ») 11¡µ (1¡ »¼
µ¡1)
µ
µ¡1
1¡ »¼µ : (32)
Time unit is assumed to be quarter. ®, ±H , ±K , !, µ are set to be the values used
in growth and business cycle literature. A, ¯, and Ã are set such that the annual real
interest rate is 3% and that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is unity (hence n = 0:5)
at the steady state with ¼ = 1:0421=4 and ° = 1:0045. The values of the structural
parameters are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Structural parameters
A ® ¯ ±H ±K ! Ã µ
0.0445 0.36 1:0045=1:031=4 0.005 0.025 0.029 807.4 4.33
Figure 1: Monetary-friction e®ect (when ¼ increases)
K
nH
O
(10)
(7)
r
r0
K
nH
¡
K
nH
¢0
Figure 2: Sticky-price e®ect (when ¹ increases)
K
nH
O
(10)
(7)
r
r0
¡
K
nH
¢0K
nH
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Figure 3: E®ects of in°ation in the exogenous contract duration model
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
ANNUAL INFLATION
A
N
N
U
A
L 
G
RO
W
TH
Panel A. Growth Rate of Output
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
ANNUAL INFLATION
A
N
N
U
A
L 
N
O
M
IN
A
L 
IN
TE
RE
ST
 R
A
TE
Panel B: Nominal Interest Rate
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
1.3
1.32
1.34
1.36
1.38
ANNUAL INFLATION
A
V
ER
A
G
E 
M
A
RK
U
P
Panel C: Average Markup
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
20
40
60
80
100
ANNUAL INFLATION
FR
EQ
UE
NC
Y
Panel D: The Frequency of Changing Prices (1−ξ)
Note: Solid line when » = 0:9, broken line when » = 0:85, dash{dotted line when » = 0:7,
dotted line when » = 0 (°exible-price economy).
13
Figure 4: E®ects of in°ation in the endogenous contract duration model
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Figure 5: E®ects of in°ation in the endogenous contract duration model (around zero
in°ation)
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